For many years, modern social science and philosophy have been a battlefield of conflicting visions of the human person. There are many armies involved in this fight—among them the personalists who, even among themselves, represent different approaches to the understanding of the human person.G. W. Allport states that both philosophy and psychology are interested in the same common subject matter—that is, the human person.1 Allport's statement in this regard is very clear: personalistic psychology and philosophy must join forces to fight (...) against the reduction of the human person to a mere football or an academic pawn. We have to acknowledge an interior power of self-directedness in the human person.This article is .. (shrink)

Czy emocje mogą wpływać na myślenie? Jaka jest ich geneza? Oto pytania, które są przedmiotem naukowej refleksji w prezentowanym opracowaniu, które stawia sobie za cel interdyscyplinarną analizę problematyki stanów emocjonalnych w odniesieniu do procesów kognitywnych. Najnowsze badania neuronaukowe przynoszą coraz więcej odkryć, które pomagają nam lepiej zrozumieć pracę mózgu oraz centralnego układu nerwowego oraz ich relacji do tzw. wyższych funkcji umysłowych jak planowanie, czy poznanie. Wskazują one na wzajemną relacje stanów emocjonalnych oraz procesów poznawczych, co jest kolejnym krokiem w dyskusji (...) problemu mind-body. (shrink)

Borden Parker Bowne was the founder of the School of Philosophy in Boston, taught there for more than a generation, and made a lasting impression on American philosophy. During Bowne’s career at Boston University (from 1876 until his death 1910), many of his students, who later also became professors in different areas, were inspired by his thinking and his person. His basic conviction is that it is the human person that is at the basis of Ontology and Ethics : the (...) person that preserves its identity within change thanks to memory; the person that is active in knowing and choosing; the person that acts deliberately towards values; the person that thinks – all these at least potentially. The purpose of the article is to examine Bowne’s metaphysics, i.e. the roots of his view of Personalism. What emerges is his idea of existence in general and of human existence in particular. This is done also historically, by examining some earlier views of man and reality in general, which were the background for Bowne’s specific ideas. He begins from his idea of existence as active and self-determining, and of nature as activated by the intellect and will of God, the Most-High Person. That is why the human person has the attributes of awareness and self-awareness, freedom and the ability to act, and self-control. The connection of Bowne’s Personalism with idealism also presents the problem of how do we come to discover the notion of person, which is not from simple experience of reality, but is rather developed or postulated. For Bowne the model for the notion of person is the Person of God. If we look at reality from the perspective of God-Person (Person par excellence), there is the danger of theologizing Philosophical Anthropology, and a reality of Bowne’s metaphysics, which wasn’t very popular among many philosophers. Nonetheless Bowne’s ideas were positively received by the Church in America, and were used for many years as the model for defending the Christian world-view against the attacks of naturalism. In that context, his Personalism effectively fulfilled its role, showing the human person to be a spiritual being, ultimately coming from God, the Most-High Person. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed exposition of one of the most practical and popular methods of proving theorems in logic, called Natural Deduction. It is presented both historically and systematically. Also some combinations with other known proof methods are explored. The initial part of the book deals with Classical Logic, whereas the rest is concerned with systems for several forms of Modal Logics, one of the most important branches of modern logic, which has wide applicability.

First-order logic is formalized by means of tools taken from the logic of questions. A calculus of questions which is a counterpart of the Pure Calculus of Quantifiers is presented. A direct proof of completeness of the calculus is given.

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens' weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic Φv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

The concepts of question evocation and erotetic implication play central role in Inferential Erotetic Logic. In this paper, deduction theorems for question evocation and erotetic implication are proven. Moreover, it is shown how question evocation by a finite non-empty set of declaratives can be reduced to question evocation by the empty set, and how erotetic implication based on a finite non-empty set of declaratives can be reduced to a relation between questions only.

Inferential erotetic logic and inquisitive semantics give accounts of questions and model various aspects of questioning. In this paper we concentrate upon connections between inquisitiveness, being the core concept of INQ, and question raising, characterized in IEL by means of the concepts of question evocation and erotetic implication. We consider the basic system InqB of INQ, remain at the propositional level and show, inter alia, that: a disjunction of all the direct answers to an evoked question is always inquisitive; a (...) formula is inquisitive if, and only if it evokes a yes–no question whose affirmative answer expresses a possibility for the formula; inquisitive formulas evoke questions whose direct answers express all the possibilities for the formulas, and each question erotetically implies a question whose direct answers express the possibilities for the direct answers to the implying question. (shrink)

We examine some extensions of the constructive propositional logic with strong negation in the setting of varieties of $\mathcal{N}$ -lattices. The main aim of the paper is to give a description of all pretabular, primitive and preprimitive varieties of $\mathcal{N}$ -lattices.

entailment; families of sets; logic of questions.

Giulio Cesare Vanini, called by 17th-century theologians the „eagle of atheists”, criticized vehemently the fundamental assumption of Christian anthropology according to which virtues in their nature are something alien to the human being, and only vices and vicious inclinations should be peculiar to it. Vanini discards the theological alienation and restores the dignity of man as an individual of a reasonable and moral nature. According to Vanini, the existence of God as a giver of soul would deprive man of his (...) dignity. Thus, if man received his soul from God, nobody could in fact be father to his children, as he would not be able to transfer his essence to his offspring. An interesting item in Vanini’s considerations is his materialistic idea that men’s nature and conduct are determined by external factors, e.g., by food. As food is transformed into the „substance” of the consumer, „we consist of what we consume”. Vanini observes that rich people feed themselves differently than the poor and concludes that differences in habits may be attributed to different nutrition. Heroic deeds are explained by Vanini by that certain patterns of behaviour of people we adore or esteem are distinctly inculcated on our imagination. In certain situations these patterns „incite us to similar deeds”. To Vanini, the aim of his life was discarding lies and acting „for the enriching of the world of culture”. (shrink)